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INTRODUCTION
At the intersection of law and politics, Republicans have continually
run red lights, committed hit-and-runs, and otherwise flouted constitu-
tional norms. At least that is what Professor Peter Shane would have us
believe. In his provocative paper, Professor Shane argues that over the
past two decades Republicans (especially those in Congress) have repeat-
edly violated separation of powers norms in a manner that evinces con-
tempt for pluralism and the Constitution's separation of powers.'
Professor Shane essentially makes three points. First, separation of
powers norms are increasingly fragile and have been violated as they
never have been before, and that their wobbly state is bad for the nation. 2
Second, Republicans are the norm-breakers. 3 Third, they are norm-
breakers for reasons congenital to the modem Republican Party, a nar-
row party that is homogeneous, white, dominated by the right-wing, and
thus hostile to the Constitution's separation of powers. 4
t Professor of Law, University of San Diego. Thanks to the Cornell Journal of Law and
Public Policy and Professor Cynthia Farina for their kind invitation to attend the conference.
Special thanks to Professor Peter Shane for suggesting my name to the conference organizers
as a commentator. Though I disagree quite vigorously with Professor Shane's claims, I salute
his desire for commentators who might disagree with him. Thanks also to Michael Rappaport
for comments on an earlier draft.
i Peter M. Shane, When Interbranch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, "Or-
derly Shutdowns," Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial "Coups," 12 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 503 (2003).
2 Id. at 510.
3 Id. at 514-33.
4 Id. at 534, 537.
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I disagree with each of these claims. To begin with, we ought not to
lament changing interbranch norms. Given the predictable interbranch
friction in a system of separated powers, interbranch norms inevitably
will change over time. The inescapable creation and destruction of inter-
branch norms is not a process to be feared or despised. What matters is
not merely whether some institution has broken a norm, but whether the
norm supposedly violated is one worth preserving. For instance, if there
were a norm of rubberstamping treaties, few ought to shed tears if the
Senate began to examine treaties more carefully. Hence, the mere fact
that interbranch norms might have changed recently is not reason for
anyone to fret or panic.
Assuming that interbranch norms have been changing lately, it is
not obvious that the Republicans deserve all the credit (or blame). In the
past, congressional Democrats have taken many of the actions that Pro-
fessor Shane protests (such as stalling judicial nominees or presenting
presidents with all-or-nothing appropriation bills).5 Nonetheless, they
escape his censure because they took these actions while opposing sup-
posedly unpopular presidents. Yet a norm's application cannot depend
upon something as mercurial and uncertain as popularity. We will be
able to say very little that is sensible and consequential about norms and
their violation if we also have to check the Gallup polls of the era. In-
deed, it seems unlikely that an interbranch norm exists at all if it does not
apply when one or more branches are unpopular and therefore weak.
Rather, it would seem that meaningful norms exist only if they apply
generally, regardless of whether the application of the norm would cater
to public opinion. If Professor Shane truly cherishes these norms, he
should direct at least some of his indignation at Democrats in Congress.
Finally, contrary to what Professor Shane seems to argue, the Grand
Old Party, for all its faults, has no beef with "deliberative legitimacy."
Nor is it opposed to democracy, accountability, or checks and balances.
To be sure, it is opposed to the Democratic Party, and it may have had a
hand in undermining some of the interbranch norms Professor Shane
prizes. However, these facts do not mean that the Republicans are to be
feared and loathed anymore than the Democratic Party should be feared
and loathed for its opposition to the Republicans and its active participa-
tion in undermining the norms at issue. This is not to say that one cannot
fault the Republicans for their politics and their policies. But to go fur-
ther and claim that they are systematically hostile to the Constitution's
checks and balances, or are somehow antidemocratic, as Professor Shane
repeatedly claims, requires much more by way of evidence. Professor
Shane simply has not made the case that the Republican Party is the
5 See id. at 519.
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party of angry, white, anti-separation of powers, antidemocratic, anti-de-
liberative, males.
I. THE CONTINUAL CREATION AND DESTRUCTION OF
INTERBRANCH NORMS
As is well-known, the Constitution establishes certain separation of
powers rules. What those rules dictate is a subject of great dispute.
Some commentators claim that Congress has the preeminent role in for-
eign affairs; 6 others believe that the Constitution assigns this role to the
President. 7 Some assert that the President controls the law-enforcement
bureaucracy; 8 others assert that Congress can structure the executive ma-
chinery as it sees fit.9 Some contend that the Court has been too eager to
strike down federal statutes. 10 Others believe that the Court has been too
deferential in the past and has resumed its historical role as a judicial
safeguard for federalism. t ' In the interstices of these contested rules,
6 See John Hart Ely, On Constitutional Ground 149 (1996); Harold Hongju Koh, The
National Security Constitution 79 (1990); Francis D. Wormuth & Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain
the Dog of War 177 (1986).
7 See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001); H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President's
Authority Over Foreign Affairs, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1471 (1999).
8 See generally Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 701; Steven Calabresi & Saikrishna Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Laws 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven Calabresi & Kevin Rhodes, The Structural Consti-
tution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992).
9 See Peter Shane, Returning Separation-of-Powers Analysis to its Normative Roots:
The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions and Other Private Suits to Enforce Civil Fines, 30
ENVTL. L. REP. 11,081 (2000); Cynthia Farina, The 'Chief Executive' and the Quiet Constitu-
tional Revolution, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 179 (1997). See also Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L. J. 1725, 1729 (1996); A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial
Presidency's New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1346 (1994); Morton Rosenberg, Congress's
Prerogative Over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan
Administration's Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627 (1989); A.
Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787
(1987).
1O See generally Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV.
80 (2001) (criticizing the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions as reflecting a growing disre-
spect for Congress); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001) (claiming that the Constitution was not originally under-
stood to authorize judicial review); Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitu-
tional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 953 (2000) (criticizing the expansion of state sovereign immunity); Larry D. Kramer,
Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215
(2000) (criticizing as institutionally wrongheaded the Court's imposition of decisionmaking
process requirements on Congress in federalism cases); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimmel,
110 YALE L. J. 441 (2000) (criticizing the Court's decisions on Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
I I To be sure, some scholars have defended the Court's jurisprudence. See, e.g., Lynn A.
Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE
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there are uncertain, contested, and ever-changing interbranch norms.
The Constitution grants the President a veto and does not limit how often
the President may veto bills. 12 Likewise, the Constitution grants Con-
gress the power to appropriate funds,' 3 but, with few exceptions, 14 it
does not require the Congress to fund anything. Finally, the Constitution
grants to the Senate the responsibility of confirming all non-inferior of-
ficers of the United States,' 5 without dictating how the Senate must exer-
cise its check.
As one might expect, the interaction of certain settled rules with
changeable norms in an environment where politicians are ever grasping
for power necessarily results in hydraulic pressure for changes in estab-
lished norms. Certain presidents will wield the veto more aggressively;
others will decide that they should take a backseat to Congress in legisla-
tive matters. Similarly, the Senate sometimes will defer to the Presi-
dent's treaty proposals; at other moments in time, the Senate will be
more wary of foreign entanglements.
Changes in these norms are often appropriate and desirable. Much
of the legal academy favors the relatively recent norm of expansive read-
ings of the Bill of Rights, even when these interpretations limit the fed-
eral government. Likewise, many people welcome the President's
relatively recent and much larger role in tax and spending policy because
they believe that the President is the only elected federal official who
considers the welfare of the entire country in making tax and spending
decisions. Perhaps Professor Shane would agree that the outdated norm
of judicial nominees not testifying before the Senate, a norm in place for
more than a century, 16 was discarded for good reason. Obviously, not all
norms are good ones and, therefore, not all norm-breaking is bad.
L.J. 75 (2001) (arguing that the Court should enforce the federalism provisions of the Constitu-
tion); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense
of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995) (defending the Court's enforcement of
federalism guarantees); Saikrishna Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 887 (2003) (arguing that the Constitution, as originally understood, authorizes
judicial review of federal statutes); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persis-
tence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEx. L. REV. 1459 (2001) (arguing that judi-
cial review is a valid safeguard for federalism).
12 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2.
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
14 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 6 (President's salary cannot be diminished or increased
during the period in which he was elected); U.S. CONST. art. III, § I (judicial salaries cannot be
diminished).
15 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
16 See Ronald Rotunda, The Senate's Role in the Nomination and Confirmation Process:
Whose Burden?, submitted to the Subcommittee on an Administrative Oversight and the
Courts of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, at http://www.senate.
gov/-judiciary/oldsite/te090401so-rotunda.htm (Sept. 4, 2001).
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Indeed, Professor Shane admits that many of his preferred norms
began during the New Deal or post-World War II.' 7 Should we fret over
the demise of the pre-existing norms that Professor Shane's preferred
norms replaced? We should not be upset merely because these old
norms are no more. We should only long for those discarded norms that
were better than their successors.
Given the inevitable fluidity of norms, the question has to be
whether an existing norm is better than the one that might replace it.
Professor Shane's preferred norms (Congress may statutorily constrain
the President's direction of foreign policy; Congress should not present
the President an all-or-nothing appropriation bill; Congress should wield
the impeachment power in a more restrained manner; and the Senate
should play a more deferential confirmation role) are hardly indisputably
better than the norms that may have replaced them, or that may replace
them in the future. Nor, for that matter, are these norms obviously better
than the norms that they replaced. Merely establishing that some branch
or political party is upsetting norms hardly indicates that something rot-
ten is afoot.
That norms are often important for the smooth functioning of gov-
ernment is beyond dispute. Deciding what those norms should be, how-
ever, requires an argument as to each norm. Professor Shane, rather than
arguing for his preferred norms, assumes the utility of each one. Though
he may be right as to each one, he has yet to make the case for them.
II. AWARDING CREDIT (OR APPORTIONING BLAME)
FOR NORM-BREAKING
There is the separate question of who should get the credit (or the
blame) for violating established norms. Even assuming that the norms
Professor Shane discusses actually existed at some point in our nation's
history, one can make credible and powerful arguments that Democrats,
rather than Republicans, originally violated at least some of these norms.
In particular, one could argue that Democratic Congresses first gave the
President all-or-nothing appropriation bills and that Senate Democrats
first stalled judicial nominations during the last year of the first Bush
administration. If one accepted these claims, one might have to question
whether some of the norms identified by Professor Shane even existed at
the time the Republicans supposedly violated them. Indeed, one might
conclude that rather than violating norms, the Republicans were actually
following other, more recent norms that had replaced the outdated norms
that Professor Shane prizes.
17 See Shane, supra note 1, at 511.
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Professor Shane colorfully describes the Republican Senate's "at-
tempts to hijack" the power of judicial appointments.' 8 In this case, Re-
publican "obstructionism" supposedly violated a norm of deferential
review of judicial nominations. Professor Shane recites numerous statis-
tics meant to show that the Republicans engaged in "unprecedented" tac-
tics to delay confirmations.19 Yet Professor Shane apparently is unaware
of other statistics that cast a decidedly different light on the actions of the
Republican Senate and its Democratic predecessors. Professor Shane
praises the 1992 Democratic Senate for confirming 66 of President
Bush's judicial nominees in 1992 and criticizes the 2000 Republican
Senate for not taking action on some 40 nominees. 20 What he fails to
mention are the 54 judicial nominations of President Bush in which the
Senate took no action in 1992.21 It would seem that the Republican Sen-
ates of 1996 and 2000 could cite the 1992 Senate as the model for their
supposedly "unprecedented" acts.
Professor Shane also neglects to examine how President Clinton's
nominations to the bench fared compared to President Reagan's. Though
both Presidents served for eight years and though both had almost 400
judges confirmed, they faced rather different institutional constraints.
President Reagan had his judges confirmed by a Republican Senate for
six of eight years. President Clinton had about the same number of
judges confirmed, despite the fact that "obstructionist" Republicans con-
trolled the Senate for six of President Clinton's eight years. One must
wonder how successful the Republicans' efforts to obstruct were if Presi-
dent Clinton's nominations fared so well in the face of a Republican
Senate. 22 Truly obstructionist Republicans have cause for complaint, es-
pecially in light of more recent and more successful Democratic
obstruction.
The simple fact is that, though both parties have generally approved
presidential nominees to the judiciary, both also have applied "the
brakes" at the end of presidential terms in the hope that their parties
would be able to capture the presidency and fill the judicial offices left
vacant. For some reason, Professor Shane has chosen to single out recent
Republican senators as if they were particularly obstructionist. A more
comprehensive examination leads to the conclusion that no party has had
18 See id. at 526.
19 See id. at 527.
20 See id.
21 See Press Release, Senator Jeff Sessions, Ghosts Of Nominations Past: Setting The
Record Straight, at http://www.aclj.org/news/judicialconf/020510_sessions.asp.
22 See Opening Statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Ranking Republican Member
Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Hearing on "Ghosts of Nomina-
tions Past: Setting the Record Straight," available at http://www.aclj.org/news/judicialconf/02
0509_hatch.asp (last visited June 23, 2003).
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a monopoly on obstructing judicial nominations, and that there is a tradi-
tion of obstructionism in the last two years of a presidential term.23 If
anything is new, it is the recent Democratic tactic of obstruction through-
out an entire presidential term. Only time will tell whether Democrats
will receive credit for creation of a new norm.
If the stalling of judicial nominations at the end of presidential term
has gone on for more than a decade, it is hard to say that the Republicans
in 2000 (or 1996) somehow violated an accepted and meaningful inter-
branch norm of deference to presidential nominations to the bench. Per-
haps Professor Shane's evident displeasure is better directed at the
Senate's Democrats circa 1992 (or 1988). Or perhaps the Republicans of
1980 are at fault, if they also tried to run out the clock on President
Carter's nominees. Indeed, one might say that the 1996 and 2000 Re-
publican senators were following an interbranch norm of stalling at the
end of a presidential term.24
Another tactic that upsets Professor Shane is the supposed decision
by Congressional Republicans to "shut down" the government in 1995.25
But as Professor Shane must know, the congressional Republicans did no
such thing. Republicans in Congress passed appropriation bills to their
liking and President Clinton vetoed them because they were not to his.
The resulting lack of appropriations caused the government shutdown.
When two branches disagree in a situation where their concurrence is
necessary, it is possible to blame one, rather than the other, for a failure
to come to a consensus. But that requires a rather complicated and
highly contestable argument about which side was "right" and which side
negotiated in good faith. Professor Shane never makes such an
argument.
23 Eugene Volokh has claimed that Democratic senators began applying the brakes in
1988 at the end of Ronald Reagan's second term. He has noted that there was "a period of
time when there was a general understanding that presidents would get more of their nomina-
tions confirmed during their first two years in office than at the end of a term." Eugene
Volokh, Confirmation History, at http://volokh.blogspot.com (Apr. 30, 2003). In a recent
study, Sheldon Goldman has come to the same conclusion. See Sheldon Goldman, Assessing
the Senate Judicial Confirmation Process: The Index of Obstruction and Delay, 86 Judicature
251, 257 (2003) (noting that obstruction increases during "presidential years").
24 To his credit, Professor Shane notes in a footnote that Republicans might have been
following a new norm in delaying consideration of President Clinton's appointments. See
Shane, supra note 1, at 533 n.151. He also seems to admit that both sides have engaged in
obstruction in the last two years of a presidential term. See id. Still, he claims that the Repub-
licans are responsible for "'ratcheting up'" the obstruction, creating a new, "less salutary equi-
librium." See id. If this is true of the Republicans, it is also true for Democrats. Sheldon
Goldman's "index of obstruction" indicates that obstruction of appeals court nominees hit an
all-time high in the 107th Congress, when the Senate was controlled by the Democrats. See
Goldman, supra note 23, at 257 (table 6). Senate Democrats were also responsible for setting
previous all-time highs in the 100th and 102nd Congresses. See id. Objectively speaking,
both sides have ratcheted up the delaying tactics at the end of a presidential term.
25 See Shane, supra note 1, at 516, 517.
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Even if the 1994 Congressional Republicans were to blame because
of their refusal to compromise with President Clinton (rather than the
other way around), they were hardly the first Congress to present the
President with a "take it or leave it" appropriations offer. To his credit,
Professor Shane cites Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield as having
issued a similar ultimatum to President Nixon in 1973.26 One could also
cite Congress's use of omnibus appropriations during the Reagan Ad-
ministration. In the mid-1980s, Congress played hardball by rolling up
all appropriations bills into one omnibus bill and then dared President
Reagan to veto these bills. Both Nixon and Reagan caved and signed
these bills rather than shutting down the government for extended peri-
ods of time.
Why aren't these episodes of "nuclear blackmail" lamentable col-
lapses in a separation of powers norm? Because, according to Professor
Shane, the Democrats "could plausibly assert the necessity of that strat-
egy to effect the democratic aims that underlie checks and balances. '27
With all due respect, Professor Shane has eviscerated his norm. He be-
gins with the proposition that one branch should not defund the other.28
But in order to avoid tarring the Democratic Congresses that preceded
the Republicans in 1995, he has to amend his norm to allow nuclear
blackmail where the incumbent president has approval ratings at 44% or
is "largely discredited." 29 There really is nothing left of the budget coop-
eration norm if it can be circumvented whenever a president is consid-
ered unpopular. A norm that does not apply when a president has an
approval rating of 44% is not really a norm. Nor is a norm of much
consequence when it does not serve to protect the weak branch. Mean-
ingful norms exist only if they are strong enough to withstand tempta-
tions to dog-pile on a politically unpopular branch. In any event,
Professor Shane does not show that President Reagan was similarly un-
popular in the mid-1980s, nor does he acknowledge that appropriations
blackmail might have been permissible during the Clinton administra-
tion, when President Clinton's approval ratings hovered in the low-40s.
Much of this suggests that in 1995, there was no norm against ap-
propriations blackmail. In making the President "an offer he couldn't
refuse," Republicans were following in the footsteps of their Democratic
predecessors. In vetoing their ultimatum, President Clinton decided not
to cave in and ultimately won the day. But his triumph merely means
that the Republican gambit failed. It does not mean that Republicans
were guilty of "antidemocratic assaults on checks and balances," or that
26 See id. at 519.
27 See id. at 520.
28 See id. at 516.
29 See id. at 520.
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they somehow lacked "democratic legitimacy." Sometimes losing a po-
litical fight means nothing more than losing the fight. It does not neces-
sarily signal a deep-seated hostility to the regime and its Constitution. 30
III. A POX ON BOTH YOUR PARTIES
The point in strolling down memory lane is not to suggest that Dem-
ocrats are engaged in a massive conspiracy against constitutional norms.
Indeed, in many cases the norms discussed by Professor Shane probably
did not even exist at the time they supposedly were violated. Moreover,
as noted earlier, there is nothing necessarily wrong with violating or re-
placing a nonbinding constitutional norm. It all depends upon the partic-
ular norm that one replaces.
Instead, the point of all this is that, even if one embraces the norms
identified by Professor Shane, neither party has an unblemished record.
Both have succumbed to the ever-present temptation to power-grab, with
more success in some cases than others. The story that Professor Shane
tells, of one party hell-bent against the Constitution's separation of pow-
ers and the other party ever-virtuous and ever-victimized, is simply unbe-
lievable, even for those who are unfamiliar with the last three decades.
No political party has yet cornered the market on constitutional fidelity,
much less fidelity to unconstitutionalized (and therefore non-obligatory)
interbranch norms.31
Hence, the most that can be said is that both parties have violated
certain separations of power norms. Not content with this limited claim,
however, Professor Shane goes much further than his evidence will al-
low. He concludes that Republicans have been "notably hostile to
checks and balances," are wed to presidentialism, and are engaged in
"antidemocratic initiatives." 32 As to the first charge, one could equally,
and perhaps more plausibly, argue that, in pressing for a greater role in
appropriations and appointments, congressional Republicans (and Demo-
crats) have merely more robustly exercised their "checks" to achieve a
new and different "balance." Contests for power are part of the separa-
tion of powers; they are not signs of a malignant system. As Democrats
will tell you today, the President is not entitled to every appropriation or
30 I have chosen not to comment on Professor Shane's other examples of Republican
norm-breaking, not because I agree with his characterizations and claims, but because my
point is made even if one agrees with his remaining claims. As discussed in the text, my point
is not that Democrats deserve to be censured for their obstructionism and all-or-nothing omni-
bus appropriation bills. Rather, my point is that both parties have helped create and destroy
interbranch norms.
31 Some might conclude that, in addition to the Democrat's participation in the norm-
breaking identified above, they also deserve credit (or blame) for the first "Borking" of a
judicial nominee and for the politicization of investigations of executive branch officials.
32 See Shane, supra note 1, at 533-34.
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tax cut he wishes, nor is he entitled to every appointment he desires.
Opposition to existing norms does not necessarily constitute antagonism
to the Constitution's separation of powers for the simple reason that the
norms are not part of the Constitution's separation of powers.
Professor Shane's presidentialism charge is odd for two reasons. To
begin with, those who profess a desire for a strong president do so in part
because they believe that the Constitution's separation of powers de-
mands it. Professor Shane undoubtedly disagrees with this claim, but his
disagreement does not entitle him to condemn those with whom he has a
scholarly disagreement. The most that he can say is that "presidential-
ists" just misunderstand the Constitution, 33 which is something very dif-
ferent from saying that they are hostile to its checks and balances
because they favor a strong president. This more limited claim would
suggest that presidentialists are mistaken, not that they are opposed to the
separation of powers.
The presidentialism claim is strange for a second reason: most of
the episodes Professor Shane recounts involve a Republican Congress
thwarting a Democratic president. One is hard pressed to understand
why these examples prove that Republicans are "presidentialists." In-
deed, these examples suggest the opposite-a party bent on strengthening
congressional prerogatives. I think a more complete picture of the past
two decades reveals that the Republicans have not been committed to
presidentialism any more than Democrats have been committed to con-
gressionalism. When President Clinton came into power, Democrats no
longer seemed as enamored with independent counsels, or as interested
in vigorously pressing the view that Congress must authorize all uses of
military force. The role reversals that took place over the past two de-
cades suggest less a commitment to abstract principals than a commit-
ment to power. Both parties quickly and opportunistically change their
rhetoric and tactics when new circumstances arise.
Finally, there is no evidence to support Professor Shane's remarka-
ble claim that Republicans have been engaged in antidemocratic initia-
tives, other than violations of supposed norms, which were also violated
by members of the Democratic Party. If the Republicans are hostile to
democratic pluralism because of their violations of interbranch norms,
the same must be true of the Democrats. Of course, the problem here is
that Professor Shane links two unrelated things. The violation of separa-
tion of powers norms hardly suffices to prove a hostility towards democ-
racy. At most it indicates a hostility to existing separation norms. Thus,
even if I agreed that Republicans or Democrats have been upending sep-
aration of power norms right and left, it would not follow that they are
33 See id. at 534.
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somehow opposed to democracy. One can be for or against existing in-
terbranch norms regardless of one's position about democracy. Because
Professor Shane provides no other reason for supposing that Republicans
are hostile to democracy, he has not made his case.
CONCLUSION
Is the sky falling? At times, Professor Shane seems to suggest as
much. But one is never quite sure exactly why. His article ends with a
lament that the congressional Republicans are patsies for the White
House. According to Professor Shane, they do not seem interested in
checking the President and, instead, seem intent on fighting the Demo-
cratic opposition. It seems that sometimes congressional Republicans are
insufficiently deferential (when it comes to Democratic presidents) and
others times too obsequious (when it comes to Republican presidents).
They just cannot find the equilibrium, the happy medium, occupied by
pluralistic, heterogeneous, democratic, checks and balances-loving
Democrats.
If there is a problem here, it is an ordinary problem of partisan polit-
ics, not one of constitutional dimension. No one should be surprised that
Democratic members of Congress gave a pass to President Clinton on
many of the issues for which they now hound President Bush (access to
governmental documents and war powers, for instance). And no one
should be astonished that Republicans are more deferential to a Republi-
can President than to a Democratic one. It is the same as it ever was.
Branches will behave "badly" from time to time-it is part of our
system.
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